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ULTRA-WRONG ABOUT THE "ULTRA-RIGHT" 
Terry Eastland* 
PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN To RE-
WRITE THE CONSTITUTION. By Herman Schwartz. New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1988. Pp. xiv, 242. $19.95. 
I 
Herman Schwartz, aspiring to make "some contribution to the his-
tory of our times" (p. ix), describes this book as one not written "in 
tranquil recollection of things past" (p. ix). That's an understatement. 
"High dudgeon," rather than tranquility, best describes his state of 
mind: Schwartz adopts an alarmist posture about what he calls "The 
Conservative Court Packing Campaign"1 and its implications for the 
future. Nothing that the Reagan administration did in selecting 
judges meets his approval, and something like a jurisprudential holo-
caust apparently awaits us now that the Republican Party has main-
tained its hold on the presidency. 
Schwartz, a law professor at the American University, may be sur-
prised to learn that I agree with him on some things. I agree, for 
example, that Senators may take a judicial nominee's ideology into 
account in the confirmation process, contrary to the stated position of 
the Reagan administration. And I even agree that President Reagan 
made som~ poor choices for the federal bench, Daniel Manion being 
the most conspicuous example.2 But I made it to the end of the book 
only out of a sense of obligation. 
It's not that Schwartz is a bad writer, but the polemical nature of 
this book will wear out all but the most committed, or already per-
suaded, readers. The word "ultraconservative" appears no fewer than 
thirteen times, either as an adjective or adverb, and that doesn't in-
clude the synonyms galore, such as "extremely conservative. " 3 
* Resident Scholar, National Legal Center for the Public Interest. Special Assistant to the 
Attorney General, 1983-1985; Director of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, 1985-1988. -
Ed. 
1. This is the title of chapter one. 
2. Manion was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1986. I do, 
however, differ with Schwartz as to the reason why Manion was not a good choice. See infra text 
accompanying note 20. 
3. Only once does the word "ultraliberal" work its way into a Schwartz sentence, and its use 
is instructive. Schwartz takes umbrage at the fact some conservatives labeled as "ultraliberal" a 
lawyer under consideration for a judgeship by the Reagan administration, commenting that this 
was "a ludicrous characterization to all who know him." P. 82 . .I can only conclude that in 
Schwartz's political world there are no ultraliberals - not even himself, a proud contributor to 
The Nation, arguably the most liberal magazine there is. 
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Schwartz's frequent resort to these words suggests the kind of mind 
that has produced this book: one so smugly confident of its point of 
view that it asserts and assumes rather than argues. Packing the 
Courts is not simply for the already converted, but for the most zeal-
ous adherents of liberal ideology. 
Schwartz also has written this book the la.Zy way. He interviewed 
very few officials actually involved in judicial selection. Instead, he 
relied on newspaper and magazine clips. Packing the Courts is not the 
place to go for any.thing new. The book also has several factual errors 
that some more diligent reporting could have prevented.4 Why would 
a major house publish a book like this? Surely it would want some-
thing better reported and argued, whatever its conclusions. Here's my 
explanation: the major houses tend to be politically liberal, and will 
publish even a bad book so long as the text ratifies their view of the 
bad things the Reagan administration has been up to. I offer this with 
no scientific certainty, only the weight of persortal experience. The 
day after Attorney General· Edwin Meese III relieved me of my re-
sponsibilities in May 1988 I received a Western Union Mailgram from 
an editor at none other than Scribner's, which published this book, 
advising that he was "prepared to offer [a] substantial advance on [my] 
personal story and on the Justice Department in crisis."5 Scribner's 
wasn't the only major house interested in my "personal story." I was 
obviously a delicious prospect for these houses: who better than a con-
servative - and one on the inside, no less - to tell the truth about the 
ogre A.G.! I declined the thoughtful invitation, but I was struck by 
the apparent politics· of Scribner's and others. And I doubt that 
Scribner's would publish a book on Reagan's judges that was as uno-
riginal and polemical as Schwartz's, yet written from a conservative 
political perspective. · , 
Packing the Courts does offer, albeit unintentionally, one thing that 
is new: a clear view into the political culture of Washington. That 
culture is heavily liberal and Schwartz is a part of it. In several 
passages he discusses how he and his liberal allies went to work to 
thwart Reagan judgeships. Chapter six begins this way: "Sometime in 
November 1984, a few days after the Reagan reelection landslide, I 
met Nan Aron and William Taylor for lunch at a Chinese restaurant 
in Washington to talk about the federal courts" (p. 74). There follows 
an account of how a number of liberal groups - twenty-nine to begin 
with - organized the "Judicial Selection Project," the purpose of 
which was to oppose "'really terrible' nominees" (p. 76). The number 
of groups opposed to Reagan's judicial selection efforts grew during 
4. Contrary to what Schwartz writes (p. 6), Bruce Fein was not one of Attorney General 
Edwin Meese Ill's speechwriters. And Grover Rees was in charge of judicial selection at the 
Justice Department for only one year, not several. P. 49. 
5. I left the Department on May 16. The Mailgram, from which I quote, arrived on May 17. 
1452 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1450 
the second term, and the anti-Reagan forces enjoyed their greatest suc-
cess - a great political success by any measure - when the Senate 
rejected ~he Supreme Court nomination of Robert H. Bork in 1987. 
Schwartz's account of the strategy of the anti-Bork groups is note-
worthy. He describes how they realized that pro-abortion types and 
pro-gay activists should stay out of sight, lest their views displace 
Bork's in the public eye and become an issue. 6 Schwartz and others 
knew perfectly well that the Bork battle would be lost if it turned into 
a referendum on cultural liberalism. In passages like these, Schwartz 
demonstrates how "inside the Beltway" liberalism can undo the efforts 
of a conservative president elected with the overwhelming support of 
the American people. 
Alas for Schwartz, he published this book before the 1988 political 
conventions, so he did not have the benefit of seeing George Bush run 
against the forces that opposed Bork.7 But Bush skillfully turned the 
1988 election, at least in part, into the referendum on Bork that never 
was. 8 The Bork battle did not end with his rejection in the Senate, 
nor, I should add, with the election of Bush. The battle is ongoing. If 
Bush nominates a conservative like Bork, it will be joined again, with 
Herman Schwartz no doubt writing op-eds, organizing his friends, 
perhaps defeating a conservative nominee or two, and maybe getting 
Scribner's to publish Packing the Courts IL 
II 
Schwartz's tale begins with the 1980 election, which, he says, 
"raised hopes on the right that this time the courts could be brought 
under control" (p. 4). Court-packing wasn't pursued aggressively un-
til the second term, he says, but "Reagan's plans to bend the federal 
judiciary to the right were made very early" (p. 5). For proof, he 
quotes from the Republican Party Platform of 1980.9 While conced-
ing that "[e]very president wants judges who will see the world the 
way he does" (p. 8), Schwartz says that the Reagan administration 
6. P. 134; see also Eastland, Bork Vote: Just a Battle in a 50-Year War, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 
1987, at 34, col. 3. 
7. The American Civil Liberties Union publicly opposed Bork. Significantly, Bush made the 
ACLU an issue in the presidential campaign. 
8. Democratic complaints about Bush's "negative" campaigning (his use of "the Pledge is· 
sue," the Willie Horton story, and the like, to identify Michael Dukakis as a liberal) were amus-
ing. But what Bush did was nothing as compared to what liberals did to Judge Bork just a year 
earlier. 
9. Reagan pledged to pick judges who would be 
women and men who respect and reflect the values of the American people, and whose 
judicial philosophy is characterized by the highest regard for protecting the rights of law-
abiding citizens ... is consistent with the belief in the decentralization of the federal govern-
ment and efforts to return decision-making power to state and local elected officials •.. who 
respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life •.. [and] who share 
our commitment to judicial restraint. 
P. S. 
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went "beyond prior efforts" (p. 9). It "aimed at a much wider range of 
issues than any previous president ... tried to affect, and it ... pressed 
with much greater determination and much more systematically" 
(p. 9). In Schwartz's view, the reason for this "heightened zeal" lies in 
the fact that the only feasible way for Reagan to maintain right-wing 
support was to pick conservativejudges (p. 9). 
Schwartz writes that the "conservative crusade" targeted 
the transformation of American life and law that began in the 1920s: the 
increased openness and freedom; the refusal of those who had always 
been outside the favored circle of power and privilege like women, 
blacks, and homosexuals, to stay in their place; the ever more powerful 
role of government in social and economic matters, and concomitant 
with that, the implicit denigration of the rugged, Darwinian individual-
ist. [p. 10] 
The "court-packing campaign" thus was nothing less than "part of a 
wide-ranging assault on the modern era," the goal being "a return not 
just to the pre-Warren Court years but to the era of Ronald Reagan's 
hero Calvin Coolidge" (p. 43) .. Because the federal courts, led by the 
Supreme Court, "helped make this transformation possible," Schwartz 
says, they became "a natural target for the reaction" (pp. 10-11). 
"The reaction" included an attack on decisions in specific constitu-
tional areas, and Schwartz treats at some iength the efforts to reshape 
two areas in particular. One is abortion, signified by Roe v. Wade, 10 
"the number one target of the social counterrevolution" (p. 12). The 
other is school prayer, although Schwartz actually deals with the 
whole notion of church-state separation. I I Efforts to reverse these de-
cisions failed during the Reagan era, but Schwartz warns that they 
could be overturned through the addition of a more conservative 
Supreme Court Justice or two (pp. 25-26). 
The conservative "reaction" also includes advocacy of "a judicial 
philosophy that challenges basic constitutional premises and doc-
trines," which, if adopted, "would undermine the very legitimacy of 
the courts' efforts to advance constitutional rights" (p. 29). Schwartz 
points first to speeches by Attorney General William French Smith 
that attacked "judicial activism" and "political policymaking," and 
then to speeches by his successor, Edwin Meese III, that criticized the 
incorporation doctrine and called for a "jurisprudence of original in-
tent" (pp. 30-32). 
To read Schwartz, nothing that either Attorney General ever said 
makes any sense. Schwartz defends the incorporation doctrine not on 
textual but political grounds, claiming that "our liberties" would be 
unsafe without it (p. 33). Voicing conventional criticisms, he rejects 
an originalist or interpretivist approach because such positions "would 
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see pp. 12-21. 
11. Pp. 21-26. 
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keep the Constitution in a powdered wig and knee breeches" (p. 34), 
and slow if not stop the judicial creation of new rights. 12 "[T]he Ninth 
Amendment explicitly allows for ri~hts not enumerated in the consti-
tutional text,'' he says (p. 38), implying that judges must discern these 
rights, since, after all, it is judges - no one else - upon whom we 
must rely for the protection of individual rights. 13 Schwartz embraces 
the view that courts must assume "an affirmative, political - activist, 
if you must - role" (p. xii). 
In chapter four, "Judicial Selection, 1793-1980" (pp. 42-57), 
Schwartz summarizes the familiar history of Supreme Court nominees 
who were spumed by the Senate - twenty-nine in all, about one of 
every five nominated. About one-third of these were not confirmed 
because of their views on public issues (p. 45), and Schwartz maintains 
that a "nominee's philosophy and ideology are proper subjects for con-
sideration by the Senate" (p. 48). The Constitution, he says, certainly 
"entitles" the president to try to appoint judges who reflect his judicial 
philosophy, but "not necessarily to succeed" (p. 49), and a senator has 
"the same obligation as the president to ensure that a judicial nominee 
will further and not undermine the senator's vision of the Constitu-
tion" (p. 49). As to the lower courts, Schwartz concludes that "atten-
tion to ideology" by either the president or the Senate "has usually 
been limited in scope and episodic in operation" (p. 55). The closest 
parallel to the Reagan administration's attention to ideology, 
Schwartz says, occurred in 1801, when the Federalists tried "to pack 
the judiciary with 'midnight judges' " (p. 55). Certainly by this point 
it becomes clear what Schwartz means by "packing the courts": not 
the scheme pushed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to increase the 
number of Justices on the Supreme Court and fill the new vacancies, 
but an effort to appoint judges (throughout the federal judiciary) who 
share the president's judicial philosophy. "Packing the courts" of 
course, smells of something bad; "selecting judges," or "nominating 
judges," or "appointing judges" would be accurate, but lack the requi-
site bite for this kind of book. But Schwartz's term, in addition to 
being biting, is misleading. President Reagan wound up appointing 
almost half of those now sitting on the federal bench. While it is true 
that he looked for individuals committed to judicial restraint, it is sim-
12. Original intent, he says, is "often difficult to discern,'' p. 35, and even if it can be dis-
cerned, it "should not be dispositive." P. 36. Schwartz insists that "it is only by the exercise ofa 
contemporary judgment, as twentieth·century Americans,'' that judges can decide the scope of a 
constitutional provision. P. 35. "There is no escape ... from the exercise of contemporary 
judgment and wisdom" (p. 35), Schwartz says, but this is a point no serious originalist would 
dispute. The issue is how and where the judge finds the rule he will apply. Originalists will be 
constrained by constitutional text and history, while nonoriginalists have been willing to turn 
quickly to other sources. See G. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY (Center for Judicial Studies monograph, 1985). 
13. Schwartz writes, "Reliance on the popular branches of government for the protection of 
individual liberty is ... a contradiction in terms." P. 38. 
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ply not true that every appointee was equally committed, or even at all 
committed, to the administration's judicial philosophy. As those in-
volved in the selection process knew, and as Schwartz could have dis-
covered through interviews, the number of lawyers who had thought 
about the administration's judicial philosophy was small, so the "pool 
of applicants" from which the President could select was not very 
deep. In many instances traditional political considerations - geogra-
phy, political friendship - influenced the choice of a nominee more 
than anything else. 
By 1981, Schwartz writes, "most federal judges shared two basic 
conceptions of their role: first, that a major function of the federal 
judiciary was to protect individual rights, and second, that they should 
interfere as little as possible with economic and other activities not 
related to civil rights and liberties" (p. 59). Schwartz adduces no evi-
dence to support this statement. It is no doubt the case that most 
judges in 1981 did regard protecting rights as a major judicial func-
tion. Contrary to what Schwartz says, the Reagan administration 
agreed with them. But it is open to doubt whether most judges, in 
1981, conceived of their work in such liberal political terms as 
Schwartz suggests.14 Certainly the administration did disagree with 
this understanding of a judge's role. 
During President Reagan's first term, Schwartz says, judicial selec-. 
tion aroused little opposition, although there were "harbingers" of 
what was to come (p. 62). One highly qualified candidate, Judith 
Whittaker, considered for a vacancy on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, was rejected by the administration "because of 
conservative pressure" (pp. 62, 64-66), even as "ultraconservative cap.-
didates" (that word again) were easily seated.15 Only J. Harvey Wil-
kinson ran into serious confirmation problems, but the Sena,te did 
ultimately approve his nomination.16 
14. Gertrude Himmelfarb brilliantly illuminates the contemporary liberalism to which, 
Schwartz believes most judges in 1981 subscribed: 
The same liberals who insist upon the largest measure of individual liberty.in one area - the 
freedom to see, read, say, and act as they please, to be free of moral restraints and social 
conventions - also tend to insist upon the largest measure of social and government con, 
trols in other areas - to provide for economic security, racial equality, social justice, envi-
ronmental protection, and the like. That the latter involve a considerable diminution of 
individual liberty is not denied by liberals; nor does this mitigate their zeaL '.fhe disjunction 
is in fact so deeply ingrained in the modern liberal sensibility that to remark upon it, to see it 
as a problem, is taken as the sign of a conservative disposition'. 
G. HIMMELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND LIBERALISM: THE CASE OF JOHN STUART MILL 324 
(1974). The disjunction, I think, is deeply ingrained in the sensibility of Professor Schwartz, and 
my remarking on it no doubt will be seen as a sign of a conservative disposition. 
15. Pp. 66-73. The "ultras" were Robert Bork, appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit; Ralph Winter, to the Second Circuit; Antonin Scalia, to the D.C. Circuit; J. 
Harvey Wilkinson to the Fourth Circuit; and Pasco Bowman, to the Eighth Circuit. All were 
academics. Schwartz notes that twenty percent of the appellate nominees were academics, "a 
modern record." P. 73. 
16. See pp. 70-73. 
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· "The Conservative Campaign to Pack the Courts" intensified in 
1985, following the reelection of President Reagan, who not only had 
to fill routinely occurring vacancies but also eighty-five new positions 
created by the Congress in 1984. As Schwartz tells it, there were con-
servative attempts to block "insufficiently pure" judicial candidates 
and actual nominees,17 a trend "particularly marked on the appellate 
level," where the administration largely has control of the selection 
process (pp. 89-96). Gradually liberal opposition developed, and in 
the summer of 1986 the Reagan administration suffered its first defeat 
in the Senate when the Judiciary Committee voted 10 to 8 to reject the 
nomination of U.S. Attorney Jefferson B. Sessions III to a district 
court seat (pp. 95-96). Meanwhile, the ABA became a tougher hurdle 
that some judicial candidates failed to clear; when it became apparent 
that some candidates would run into ratings problems with the ABA, 
they were quietly dropped from consideration.18 Later, Daniel Ma-
nion, a political conservative of thin judicial qualifications, was nomi-
nated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and 
eventually was confirmed, by one vote (pp. 103-09). Schwartz is right 
to conclude that getting Manion on the Seventh Circuit probably cost 
the administration a Senate seat. 19 Says Schwartz: "The Administra-
tion could easily have found an equally ideological candidate with 
more acceptable professional credentials and who could have been 
confirmed easily" (p. 109). 
Actually, the administration probably could have fou~d a more 
ideological (or philosophical) candidate who could have been con-
firmed more easily. It was seldom noted during the Manion fight that 
the nominee was as politically conservative as the President (perhaps 
even more conservative) but had probably thought only slightly more 
about judicial philosophy than the President had. He was hardly a 
Bork (or a Scalia) when it came to deep thinking about the Constitu-
tion. The Manion nomination was much less one of ideology than 
politics; in this sense his nomination was made "the old-fashioned 
way." Past administrations have rewarded friends and supporters, 
and Manion, son of a "name" conservative, was clearly a "friend." 
His nomination is less an example of "court-packing," if that means 
choosing persons of clearly defined and thought-through judicial phi-
17. Pp. 77-89. For the most part, Schwartz identifies the Reagan administration with the 
conservative campaign to pack the courts. But he occasionally includes in this effort conserva-
tives outside the administration, including Senators Orrin Hatch and Charles Grassley. 
18. Schwartz correctly observes that the administration screened judicial candidates, intro-
ducing an interviewing process for that purpose, and also sought to reduce the role in the process 
played by the American Bar Association. Pp. 60-61. 
19. P. 109. The state of Washington refused to return Republican Senator Slade Gorton, 
who had agreed to vote for Manion when the White House promised to nominate William 
Dwyer, a liberal Democratic friend of his, to a District Court seat. Many Washington voters 
apparently were disgusted by the "swap." Pp. 107-08. 
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losophy, than of cronyism, a feature of judicial selection since the time 
of George Washington. 
The battles over Sessions and Manion caused·the most sparks in 
1986, although they obviously were far less important than the nomi-
nations of William Rehnquist to become Chief Justice and Antonin 
Scalia to take Rehnquist's seat. Schwartz concedes that Rehnquist is 
"personally charming" and has a "brilliant, swift intellect," but calls 
him "the most reactionary justice in modem times" (p. 110). Quoting 
approvingly from Justice Lewis Powell, Schwartz says the mission of 
the Supreme Court is to afford "protection [to] ... the constitutional 
rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against 
oppressive or discriminatory government action."20 Thus, "[t]o ele-
vate to leadership someone like Rehnquist ... is to· mock and dispar-
age that mission" (p. 116). Rehnquist nonetheless was confirmed, but 
by a 65-33 vote, the largest vote ever against a Chief Justice. Scalia 
then was approved without a single dissent, probably because, as 
Schwartz says, potential opponents "were preoccupied with the simul-
taneous Rehnquist nomination, and it was felt that no major changes 
would result from Scalia's election - he was simply replacing an al-
most equally conservative Burger" (p. 118). 
Control of the Senate reverted to the Democratic Party in the 1986 
election. The loss of a Republican majority weakened Reagan "con-
siderably in the judgeship wars," writes Schwartz (p. 119). A Demo-
crat, Senator Joseph Biden, became chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and Biden created a special task force to screen nomina-
tions, naming Senator Patrick Leahy as its leader (pp. 120-21). As 
things turned out, Biden's time became consumed with the successive 
Bork, Ginsburg, and Kennedy nominations - all three of whom were 
nominated by Reagan in an effort to fill the vacancy created by Pow-
ell's retirement on June 26, 1987. Schwartz mercifully spends just a 
few pages on what he and others have called "the Ginsburg fiasco" 
(pp. 143-48), and he devotes just a page to the Kennedy nomination, 
which the Senate did finally approve. He spends many more pages on 
the Bork nomination. 
As he tells it, Powell was "a moderate, humane conservative" who 
was the key vote on affirmative action, abortion, church-state rela-
tions, and other contentious issues (pp. 122-25), and his departure was 
"greeted with shock and dismay by civil rights and other liberal 
groups" (p. 125). Bork, an "ultraconservative" (again that word) was 
"a rigid, hard extremist,"21 yet his "handlers" tried to sell him not as 
20. Pp. 115-16 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, i92 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
21. P. 122. What is a rigid, hard extremist? Is a rigid extremist different from a hard ex-
tremist? Would Schwartz approve of one but not the other? Or is it bad enough, in his view, just 
to be an extremist? 
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the ideologue he was but as a "moderate conservative" (p. 125). This 
campaign "may well have been doomed from the start" because Bork 
had a "paper trail," having written a major book and scores of articles, 
speeches, and judicial opinions for more than a quarter century 
(p. 126). Bork was an advocate of "original intent" and had disagreed 
with, among other things, the Supreme Court's assertion of a right to 
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut. 22 Bork willingly answered ques-
tions from the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding his various posi-
tions, but the hearings were his "downfall" (p. 137). He didn't come 
across as a moderate conservative but as "a right-wing ideologue" 
(p. 138). What's more, "he faced the problem of remaining true to 
what he had previously said and yet appearing moderate" (p. 138). In 
their ads and public statements, Bork opponents were "occasionally 
guilty of hyperbole," Schwartz concedes, but he concludes that "how 
Bork had come across at his hearing ... was decisive" (p. 139). And it 
was "his narrow view of the Constitution and the role of the judiciary 
in protecting constitutional rights that were the issues causing his 
downfall" (p. 139). 
This is, to say the least, a highly partisan and incomplete account, 
and one is well advised to read other histories of the Bork battle.23 
Suffice it here to note that Schwartz does not condemn the words spo-
ken by Senator Edward Kennedy on the very day Bork was nomi-
nated. "Judge Bork's America," Kennedy said, "is a land in which 
women would be forced into backalley abortions, blacks would sit at 
segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens' 
doors in midnight raids, ... and the doors of the federal courts would 
be shut on millions of citizens."24 Schwartz does not even quote these 
words, which set the appalling tone for the campaign against Bork, 
and which, for history's sake, should at least have been provided in a 
footnote. But Schwartz merely alludes to a "speech some criticized as 
intemperate" (p. 135). 
Schwartz concludes that the Bork confirmation struggle was "a na-
tional plebiscite on what Americans wanted from their Constitution 
and their courts" (p. 140). But that's about as plausible as saying that 
the 1988 presidential election was a national plebiscite on the view of 
the courts held by Michael Dukakis and the ACLU. A more compel-
ling conclusion is that the Bork struggle was one skirmish in an ongo-
ing cultural war, which the left won because of certain political 
dynamics. The Senate was in the hands of Democrats; the President 
was weakened by the Iran-Contra affair; and the White House failed to 
make the case for Bork in effective political terms once Senator Ken-
nedy and his allies mounted their unprecedented campaign. (Bear in 
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
23. See, e.g., Garment, The War Against Robert H. Bork, 85 COMMENTARY 17 (1988). 
24. Quoted in id. at 19. 
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mind that never before had a multimillion dollar advertising cam-
paign, complete with television commercials, been waged against a ju-
dicial nominee. 25) ABC's Sam Donaldson had it at least partially 
right when he quipped that the Bork nomination was lost in August 
on the beaches of southern California, where Reagan and his senior 
staff had repaired for his customary month-long vacation. 
Interestingly, Schwartz believes that the Bc;>rk controversy demon-
strates the wisdom of the tradition, followed· until at least 1925, of a 
nominee declining to explain his philosophy to the Senate. Schwartz 
wants to return to that tradition but doesn't think it wi.µ happen. 
"The ground rules have now changed," he writes, "and it appears in-
evitable that future Supreme Court nominees will be questioned on the 
specifics of their philosophy" (p. 142). · 
Schwartz finished his manuscript in early 1988 so the finai'year of 
the "Conservative Campaign to Pack the Courts" is not reported. His 
final concerns are the impact of the court-packing and the future after 
Reagan. Schwartz draws conclusions t~1at are _obviously true: that 
Reagan has failed to push the Supreme Court to the ~'far right"; that 
the immediate effect of his three appointments to the Court "may be 
only a marginal shift to the right" (p. 151); and tpat, nonetheless, Rea-
gan has ensured that "for some time to come it will be very difficult to 
move the Court substantially to the left, even if. future appointments 
are made by Democratic presidents" (a consequence Schwartz does 
not applaud) (p. 151). Schwartz concludes that Reagan judges have 
had no jurisprudentially important impact on. the trial court level, but 
he believes that the "most significant changes" have occurred in the 
courts of appeals, inasmuch as "ideologues and law professors" have 
been placed on these benches (p. 152). Without providing evidence for 
his conclusions, Schwartz says many of the courts of appeals judges 
"have ignored precedent or unambiguous law," and that the Seventh 
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, especially, have become 
"forums hostile to civil rights or civil liberties claimants" (pp. 152-53). 
Schwartz admits that to assess the judges' actual 'impact, one must 
make "qualitative studies of the developing law in the circuit[s] in cer-
tain crucial areas and of the rulings of specific judges" (p. 155) -
which he does not do. Schwartz, like everyone else, is left to agree 
with Stephen Markman, the Justice Department's point man for judi-
cial selection for the past three years, who says "[i]t will take five to 
ten years before the full impact of the process is felt" (p. 163). 
Schwartz worries about what that impact might be, but his imme-
diate concern is with other consequences. Court packing "introduces 
an intensely partisan and divisive note into .the selection process" 
(pp. 165-66); it damages public perceptions of the courts; and it can 
produce "a mirror-image determination in a liberal administration" to 
25. Id. 
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pack the courts (p. 166). If this were to happen, it could impair "the 
aura of objectivity and fairness on which the authority of our courts 
ultimately depends" (p. 167). Schwartz doesn't want that to happen, 
so he offers some criteria for selecting judges. These include: high 
intelligence, integrity, experience, and distinguished credentials as a 
lawyer (p. 168). Schwartz goes on to prove that, after Reagan, the 
argument is no longer whether judicial philosophy should be central to 
the selection process but which judicial philosophy should be used. 
Thus, he spells out the kind of views judges should possess. For start-
ers, a judge should recognize that the Constitution protects a right of 
intimate relationships, of marital and other forms of privacy (p. 170). 
Also, a judge must accept "the fundamental proposition that state offi-
cials are bound by the Bill of Rights, even though there can be differ-
ences as to specifics" (p. 170). And a judge must recognize that "free 
speech is fundamental to any free society and that any restriction on 
speech must meet a heavy burden" (p. 170). Schwartz also wants 
judges who are concerned about "injustice" (p. 172). 
Yet he also wants judges to recognize the "other side of the coin," 
namely that "[t]he line between adjudication and legislation is often 
thin and even invisible" (p. 172). What Schwartz is getting at is that 
"there are limits imposed by logic, precedent, and the imperatives of 
democracy that assign primary policymaking authority to the elected 
branches and require self-discipline and self-restraint on the part of so 
unaccountable a branch of government as the judiciary" (p. 172). This 
remarkable sentence occurs on page 172 of Packing the Courts, six 
pages from the end. It is the first and only time Schwartz recognizes 
judicial policymaking as any kind of problem. To be sure, he does not 
dwell on it. He sings the praises of judicial review, which he defines as 
"[j]udicial review to preserve and advance individual rights" (p. 177). 
And without this kind of judicial review, "without courts willing and 
able to make the majestic generalities of the Constitution respond to 
the ever-changing necessities of the times, our heritage of liberty and 
justice is in jeopardy" (p. 178). This, he concludes, "is the danger that 
is posed by the conservative court-packing campaign" (p. 178). 
III 
Schwartz exaggerates and overstates even as he fails to address the 
fundamental issue involving the courts today. Perhaps there are some 
conservatives who yearn for the pre-Coolidge period, and perhaps 
there are some conservatives who want to repeal much more than the 
Court's abortion decision.26 But those who have given serious thought 
to this subject understand that even if a Supreme Court decision is 
26. It is worth noting, however, that the Court does indeed change its mind. The Congres-
sional Research Service reported in 1986 that the Supreme Court had by that year overruled 184 
of its own precedents. CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE 
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wrong, it does not follow that the Court should overturn it. As the 
discussion with respect to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 27 makes 
clear, considerations of stare decisis must also be weighed in the bal-
ance. Further, as Raoul Berger has written, "past events are not so 
easily undone." As he has put it, "overruling decisions cannot restore 
the status quo ante."28 
The real issue is less the past than the present and the foture: Will 
the federal judiciary continue to expand its reach info American life 
through the creation and protection of new rights? It's not just con-
servatives (or even "ultraconservatives") who worry about this ques-
tion, and it's not merely a political motive (such as placating the right-
wing, which Schwartz attributes to Reagan) that will move a president 
to address it. There is now a large and growing literature on the issue, 
by authors of various political persuasions.29 While Schwartz pays lip 
service to the problem of judicial policymaking, his book asks for more 
and more of it. He offers no principle by which judges might be lim-
ited in their work of "preserving and advancing rights"; one is simply 
told that judges should do that, and it is clear that for Schwartz judges 
may advance rights that cannot be found in or reasonably inferred 
from the Constitution. 
Schwartz's view of the ninth amendment (p. 38), the subject of so 
much debate during the Bork hearings, is worth examining. As he 
says, the ninth amendment does indeed allow for unenumerated rights, 
but only since 1965 has any Justice said what Schwartz also maintains: 
that the amendment protects unenumerated constitution.al rights. (Sig-
nificantly, no Supreme Court majority has ever said this.) It is aston-
ishing that Schwartz would oppose nominees who differ with his view 
on this matter. And there remains, of course, the important question: 
What are the rights Schwartz would discover and protect if he were a 
judge? Would they include those thought basic by many colonists -
rights to property and contract? Or would they include ones favored 
by political liberals? Would they embrace the right of the people to 
education or to work or to recreation? And how about, as the ACLU 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 146 
(Supp. 1986). 
27. No. 87-107 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 1988); see, e.g., Symposium: Patterson v. McLean, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1-137 (1988). 
28. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 179-80 (1987). 
29. See, e.g., J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
(1984); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR· 
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1978); W. BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1987); A. 
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); D. HOROWITZ, THE 
CoURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
WARREN CoURT (1969); G. MCDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER (1988); C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
FROM CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986); and TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY: EssAYS ON THE CoNSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (G. 
McDowell ed. 1981). 
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and other liberal interest groups have argued, the right to engage in 
homosexual conduct? Or to commit incest or take illegal drugs? 
Where do judges get the authority to discover and enforce rights that 
the ninth amendment (and the rest of the Constitution, for that mat-
ter) does not mention and that cannot reasonably be inferred from the 
text? Schwartz simply skirts all of these questions. But surely they 
are important questions for a society based on the view that all govern-
ment derives from the people. And the fact is, the judicial authority 
Schwartz assumes has never been clearly established.Jo Neither the 
history nor the text of the Constitution confers on judges the power to 
enforce extra-constitutional rights. What the Constitution does con-
tain is Article V, which provides a process by which it can be amended 
in light of contemporary needs. 
Whatever else may be said about interpretivism, it does take seri-
ously this question of judicial authority.Ji It regards the Constitution 
as law, and respects the fact that it is a written document, binding on 
those who consent to it, including judges. As Chief Justice Marshall 
observed in Marbury v. Madison, "the framers of the constitution con-
templated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as 
well as of the legislatures. "J2 
Schwartz's failure to deal with the fundamental question of judicial 
authority stems from ·an even more basic failure - his misunderstand-
ing of the design and structure of our government. Contrary to what 
he says, it is not the courts alone that protect rights. So too do the 
legislative and executive branches, as well as the states. The founding 
generation understood this. Those who signed the Declaration of In-
dependence not only believed in inalienable rights, but said that "to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed." The written Con-
stitution, informed by "a science of politics" that included separation 
of powers, federalis.m, a bicameral legislature, and an independent ju-
diciary, instituted just such a government. And it was this under-
standing that led Alexander Hamilton to say that the Constitution was 
itself "A Bill Of Rights."JJ The original document, amended more 
than two dozen times, has provided a structure of government that 
30. Originalism is far less monolithic than some critics may think. It involves determination 
of the constitutional P,rinciple to be applied, and application of that principle in a particular case, 
but originalists have differed on what those principles are and how to apply them. Furthermore, 
an originalist judge can manipulate historical materials or misapply a correct principle. See 
Bork, Foreword to G. McDOWELL, supra note 12. For a statement of how one originalist con· 
ceived his task as a judge, see Bork's opinion in Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concurring). 
31. "The questfon non-interpretivism can never answer is what legitimate authority a judge 
possesses to rule society when he has no law to apply." Bork, Foreword, in G. McDOWELL, 
supra note 12, at viii. 
32. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803) (emphasis added). 
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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over the years has well secured our rights. "The Conservative Cam-
paign to Rewrite the Constitution" is not that, but an effort to save the 
written Constitution from those, like Herman Schwartz, who would 
use it illegitimately to advance their political agenda through the 
courts. 
